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Abstract
Private machine learning involves addition of noise while training, resulting in
lower accuracy. Intuitively, greater stability can imply greater privacy and improve
this privacy-utility tradeoff. We study this role of stability in private empirical risk
minimization, where differential privacy is achieved by output perturbation, and
establish a corresponding theoretical result showing that for strongly-convex loss
functions, an algorithm with uniform stability of β implies a bound of O(
√
β) on
the scale of noise required for differential privacy.
The result applies to both explicit regularization and to implicitly stabilized ERM,
such as adaptations of Stochastic Gradient Descent that are known to be stable.
Thus, it generalizes recent results that improve privacy through modifications to
SGD, and establishes stability as the unifying perspective. It implies new pri-
vacy guarantees for optimizations with uniform stability guarantees, where a cor-
responding differential privacy guarantee was previously not known. Experimen-
tal results validate the utility of stability enhanced privacy in several problems,
including application of elastic nets and feature selection.
1 Introduction
Privacy is important in the widespread use of machine learning, as learning algorithms are increas-
ingly applied to sensitive data. When sensitive information is present in the training data, the model
output by the training process can reflect the presence of specific data items, and thus leak private
information [44].
Differential privacy [13] has emerged as the gold standard definition of statistical privacy guarantees
for machine learning. The corresponding mechanisms operate by adding random noise to the train-
ing process. Greater noise ensures greater privacy, but comes at the cost of greater loss of accuracy.
Differentially Private Empirical Risk Minimization has been a topic of extensive study in the last
decade [9, 10, 29, 4, 53, 49].
An algorithm is called stable [6] when it is guaranteed to have only a small change in the loss, on a
small change to the training dataset. Stability is known to be closely related to generalization prop-
erties [38, 15, 35]. It can be incorporated directly into learning objectives by using a regularization
term, or, as has been shown in recent works, optimization algorithms such as stochastic gradient de-
scent can be made more stable by various common modifications such as gradient clipping, dropout,
batch normalization, smaller step sizes etc [24, 41].
In this paper we show that uniform stability, defined as a bound on the change in the loss function,
in fact implies a bound on the change in the actual model output by the learning function, under
suitable convexity conditions. This result implies greater privacy for the same level of noise for
any uniformly stable algorithm, and thus generalises recent results that use specific algorithmic
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modifications to attain differential privacy (e.g. [40, 55]). The result implies guarantees of greater
privacy for anymodifications that improve the uniform stability of a learning algorithm. Our analysis
applies to output perturbation approaches to privacy, and thus can be used without modification of
existing implementations in an add-on manner suggested in [55].
We describe a specific variant of dropout that increases uniform stability, thus improving privacy.
Table 1 presents other versions of optimizations such as stochastic gradient descent with known
uniform stability bounds. As the table shows, in many of these cases, corresponding privacy results
have not been derived in previous works, and we can now guarantee improved stability-enhanced-
privacy for these versions.
We discuss the trade-off between the empirical error, training error and error due to privacy noise
induced by stability. As a practical application area, we discuss classification and feature selection
in elastic net optimizations. Experimental results on multiple datasets show that using the relation
between stability and privacy, same levels of privacy can be obtained at substantially higher accu-
racy.
2 Preliminaries
Empirical risk minimization refers to finding the model that minimizes training loss over a given
dataset. Given a training set S = {(xi, yi) ∈ X ×Y for i = {1, ..., n}}, suppose c : Y×Y → R+ is
a cost function. SupposeH is a hypothesis class, and each hypothesis h : X → Y can be represented
by a vectorw of paramteters. The loss of h on an item s = (x, y) is given by ℓ(h, s) = c(h(x), y).
The objective is to find the vector wS describing AS – the hypothesis that minimizes the average
loss over S:
AS = argmin
h∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(h, si) (1)
Thus, finding wS is equivalent to finding the best-on-average model for the training data. We use
A(S) and AS interchangeably at times, in order to emphasize that the algorithm is a function of S.
A learning algorithm is stable if the loss of the output model or hypothesis described bywS changes
only slightly on a small change in input [6]. We first define neighboring datasets as ones that differ
from one another in at most one element.
Definition 1 (Neighbouring Databases). Two databases S, S′ are neighbouring if H(S, S′) ≤ 1,
where H(·, ·) represents the hamming distance.
We are interested in Uniform Stability [6], which requires that between neighboring datasets, the
change in loss is bounded by β. Note that greater stability corresponds to smaller values of β.
Definition 2 (β-Uniform Stability [6]). An algorithm A satisfies β-uniform stability with respect
to the loss function ℓ if for neighboring datasets S, S′ ∼ D and for every datapoint s ∈ S,
|ℓ(A(S), s)− ℓ(A(S′), s)| ≤ β whereD is the (possibly unknown) distribution from which the sam-
ples are drawn.
Differential privacy is the guarantee that changing one element of a database does not change the
output probabilities of a probabilistic mechanism by more than a constant factor:
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy [13]). A randomized algorithm M satisfies ǫ-differential pri-
vacy if for all neighbouring databases S and S′ and for all possible outputs O ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(S′) ∈ O].
Differential privacy is usually achieved by adding noise. The scale, or variance, of the noise depends
on the function f being computed. The sensitivity of a deterministic vector valued function f is
given by∆f = max |f(S)− f(S′)|, with the maximum taken over all possible neighboring (S, S′).
Sensitivity uses the L1 or the L2 norm depending on the privacy mechanism [14, 55].
Differential privacy can be achieved by returning f(S) + u, where u is sampled from distribution
P (u) ∝ exp (−ǫ|u|/∆f). This is the Laplace distribution, sometimes written as Lap (∆f/ǫ)1. Sev-
eral variants have been developed for differentially private noise addition to optimization algorithms
1Lap(b) is the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and variance 2b2. b is called the scale of the distribution.
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such as stochastic gradient descent. See [50] for a comparison. The approach described above is
called Output perturbation – where SGD operates normally, and noise is added to the output. Objec-
tive perturbation was proposed by [10], where the objective function itself is perturbed. In gradient
perturbation [10], the computed gradient at each step is perturbed by noise.
2.1 Related Work
Uniform Stability. Uniform stability was proposed by [5] and further developed in [6]. The study
of algorithmic stability has been mainly used to bound the generalization error of learning algo-
rithms [38]. Many results on uniform stability use stability of the expected loss of randomized
algorithms [15], providing average-case [24, 34, 43] but not necessarily the worst-case uniform sta-
bility bounds. Recently, [17] provided tighter generalization bounds for uniformly stable algorithms
in this setting. Some modifications of learning algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent have
been shown to induce uniform stability [24, 55]. Similar observations have been made for multi-task
learning under mild assumptions [33].
Private ERM. A differentially private method for logistic regression was described in [9]. This
work was followed by [10], which extended their results to the general setting of regularized ERM
algorithms. Stability based analysis inspired from [6] is also used in [40] for private soft-margin
support vector machines (SVMs). Bounds for private ERM in more general settings are discussed
by [29, 4, 26] and [49].
Stability and Privacy. It is generally known that differential privacy implies stability. For example,
if an algorithm is ǫ-differentially private then it is 2ǫ-uniform stable [53]. However, the other direc-
tion, of how improving the stability of an algorithm influences privacy, is less clear. In comparison
to these works, we establish a relation between uniform stability and sensitivity, therefore obtaining
differentially private algorithms in terms of uniform stability. As a result, it can be applied to any al-
gorithms that applies noise based on sensitivity. In particular, this provides an approach for reducing
the sensitivity factor in privacy profiles as studied in amplification by subsampling [2]. Our results
also demonstrate the relationship between uniform stability and uniform argument stability [32] for
strongly convex loss functions.
3 Privacy via Stability
We now demonstrate how sensitivity can be bounded using uniform stability. Let us first examine
the case of regularized empirical risk minimization, where AS minimizes the loss function plus a
term penalizing large weights:
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(AS(xi), yi) +
λ
2
||wS ||22 (2)
Regularization prevents the model from overfitting to the training data, therefore improving the
generalization ability of the model. The relationship between sensitivity of the output model and
stability follows in this case by a direct extension of existing results on the sensitivity and stability
of regularized ERM [10, 40, 6].
Theorem 4. Let A denote a regularized empirical risk minimization algorithm, over dataset S, with
convex loss function ℓ(·, ·) which has Lipschitz constant L. Let H be a RKHS with a d-dimensional
feature mapping with bounded norm k(x,x) ≤ κ2 where x ∈ Rd. Then for all neighbouring
databases S, S′, the sensitivity of the weights output by A is bounded as ||wS − wS′ ||2 ≤ 4Lκnλ .
The proof of Theorem 4 follows similar arguments as [40, 6] and directly implies that increasing the
regularization in an empirical risk minimization algorithm decreases the output weight sensitivity of
that algorithm. Note that the corresponding L1-sensitivity is then bounded by 4Lκ
√
d
nλ
.
L2-regularized ERM algorithms are known to be uniformly stable with β = 2L
2κ2
nλ
[42, 6], directly
implying the following relationship between stability and sensitivity in this context:
Corollary 5. Let A denote a regularized empirical risk minimization algorithm with regularization
parameter λ, over dataset S, with convex loss function ℓ which has Lipschitz constantL and satisfies
β-uniform stability. Let H be a RKHS with a d-dimensional feature mapping with bounded norm
k(x,x) ≤ κ2 where x ∈ Rd. Then the sensitivity of A is bounded by:||wS − wS′ ||2 ≤ 2βLκ
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We now explore the more general case of empirical risk minimization for strongly-convex loss func-
tions, which is a common setting in work on private empirical risk minimization [10, 29, 4].
Definition 6. λ-Strong Convexity: ℓ satisfies λ-strong convexity if for all s ∈ S:
ℓ(A(S), s) ≥ ℓ(A(S′), s) +∇ℓ(A(S′), s)T (wS −wS′) + λ
2
||wS −wS′ ||22
Strong convexity implies that the second derivative of a function is at least a positive constant, and
that the growth of the function is lower bounded by a quadratic.
Theorem 7. Let A denote a β-uniformly stable empirical risk minimization algorithm over dataset
S, with λ-strongly convex loss function ℓ . The output sensitivity of A is bounded by:
||wS − wS′ ||2 ≤
√
2β
λ
.
The correspondingL1-sensitivity is then bounded by
√
2dβ
λ
. The theorem implies that the sensitivity
of the weights output by an algorithmA can be bounded using uniform stability. In other words, the
sensitivity of the weights learned via an algorithmA can be bounded using the sensitivity of its loss.
Note that a convex loss function with L2-regularization parameter λ is λ-strongly convex. However,
the theorem applies more generally where strong convexity is implicit, and not due to an added
regularization term.
Theorem 7 implies off-the-shelf sensitivity bounds for uniformly stable algorithms, such as those
listed in Table 1. In particular, it provides private counterparts for variants of stochastic gradient
descent, such as Nesterov accelerated gradient descent [12]. The natural way to utilize this result is
through the use of output perturbation (See Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 1 Output Perturbation via stability
1: Input: S = {(xi, yi)} for i ∈ [1 : n], loss function ℓ, sensitivity of output∆w =
√
2β
λ and privacy level ǫ.
2: wS ← minimizer of ℓ(A,S).
3: Return: wS + ν where ν ∼ Lap
(
∆w
ǫ
)
.
Remark 8. For iterative methods, the true minimum loss may not be reached in a finite number
of steps. Suppose the weights output after T steps is w˜S . Let the weight convergence rate be
given by ||w˜S −wS ||2 ≤ δconv. The sensitivity of this method is then bounded as follows: ||w˜S −
w˜S′ ||2 ≤ 2δconv+||wS−wS′ ||2. Alternatively, let the loss convergence rate be given by |ℓ˜(AS , s)−
ℓ(AS , s)| ≤ γconv. In a similar manner to Theorem 7, for any strongly-convex loss function, the
weight convergence rate δconv can be replaced with the loss convergence rate by observing that
δconv ≤
√
2γconv/λ.
4 The Stability-Privacy Trade-off
Bounding sensitivity via stability sheds light on the trade-off between empirical accuracy for the un-
derlying model and the noise required to provide privacy. We first describe empirical, generalization
and privacy error in terms of stability. We then provide examples of parameters which can be used
to tune stability for algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent and note their privacy enhancing
effect and demonstrate how a variant of dropout can be used to improve stability.
4.1 Characterizing Error via Stability
Stability describes the trade-off between achieving low training error and low generalization error
in non-private ERM [6]. In an output perturbation scenario, where noise is added proportional to
the level of sensitivity determined by the uniform stability of the algorithm, stability also controls
excess error due to the noise added for privacy.
Denote the empirical loss for an empirical risk minimization algorithm A by L(A,S) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(A
S , si), the expected population loss by LˆD(A) = Es∼D[ℓ(A, s))] and the loss achieved
by A with output perturbation by Lpriv(A,S).
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Definition 9 (Excess generalization error). The expected excess generalization error of an algo-
rithm A trained over database S ∼ D is defined as δgen = ES∼D[LˆD(A)− L(A,S)].
Excess generalization loss decreases as stability increases, with |δgen| ≤ β [6].
Definition 10 (Excess privacy error). Excess privacy error (privacy loss) is defined as δpriv =
ES [|Lpriv(A,S)− L(A,S)|].
Lemma 11. Assume A is a β-uniformly stable learning algorithm, with L-lipschitz loss ℓ and a d-
dimensional input space. Denote the ǫ-differentially private counterpart of this algorithm, obtained
by applying output perturbation with sensitivity given by Theorem 7, by Apriv . The excess privacy
error introduced by Apriv is given by δpriv ≤ Ldǫ
√
2β
λ
Lemma 11 demonstrates that privacy error decreases as stability increases. In contrast, empirical
error often increases as stability increases, as for highly stable algorithms closeness of fit to the
training data is reduced. For example, denote the minimum empirical loss achieved by an iterative
algorithm in a fixed number of steps as L˜(A,S). Given a β-uniformly stable and σ-smooth iterative
algorithm A with convex loss function ℓ, then δemp ≥ O( σnβ ) [11].
Definition 12 (Excess empirical error). The expected empirical (excess training) error of an algo-
rithm A trained over database S is defined as δemp = ES [L˜(A,S)− L(A,S)].
In this case, increasing stability reduces bounds for both generalization and privacy error, but in-
creases empirical error. For small ǫ, modest gains in empirical error afforded by a weaker level
of stability (e.g. less regularized) could be outweighed by the corresponding increase in privacy
error. This suggests that output perturbed private learning algorithms may require a higher level of
regularization than their non-private counterparts. This claim is empirically supported by both the
results presented in Section 6 and empirical results presented in seminal work on private ERM [10].
Section 4.2 provides examples of parameters which can be used to tune uniform stability for various
algorithms.
4.2 Stability Enhancing Methods
Table 1 provides examples of uniformly stable algorithms, alongside parameters which can be used
to control their stability. See Appendix A.1 for average-case uniformly stable algorithms. Typically,
the L2-regularization parameter λ is used to tune the trade-off between underlying model fit and
sensitivity. However, as demonstrated by Table 1, various other parameters can be used to control
stability (and thus sensitivity) in different scenarios. Many of these methods can be viewed as
performing implicit regularization and are widely used across machine learning. As the table shows,
in many versions of optimization, there are known stability bounds, but no corresponding privacy
bound. In these cases, we can now claim improved privacy.
Corollary 13 implies that identifying stability enhancing actions within a private machine learning
algorithm, such as those listed in Table 1, amplifies its privacy guarantee without requiring more
noise. If β is the best known stability guarantee for algorithm A, then a Laplace noise of scale
O(
√
β)
ǫ
guarantees ǫ-differential privacy. If the stability guarantee ofA is improved, for example, due
to better analysis, then the privacy guarantee improves correspondingly without additional noise:
Corollary 13 (Privacy enhancement). Suppose A has known guarantee of β1-uniform stability,
and Laplace perturbation of scale b guarantees ǫ-differential privacy. If stability guarantee of A
improves to β2 < β1, then under the same perturbation strategy, the privacy guarantee improves to√
β2
β1
· ǫ-differential privacy.
Increasing Stability via Dropout. We now provide an example of a variant of dropout which can
be used to increase stability. In stochastic gradient descent, dropout [45] is equivalent to updating
the weights using D∇ℓ as opposed to ∇ℓ, where D is a randomized ‘mask’ setting some values of
∇ℓ to 0 [24].
2Batch normalization has been shown to improve the Lipschitzness of the loss function [41]. This improve-
ment can be substituted into existing worst-case stability results for SGD [55].
3The uniform stability result of [33] can be applied to a single task used in the final output of the MTL
model where the other tasks regularizes the model. [22] used output perturbation for MTLR.
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Method Parameters Stability
Prev. Work
(Output Pert.)
Prev. Work
(Obj. Pert.)
Regularized ERM [5] n, λ, L O(L
2
nλ
) [10, 40] [10, 40]
SGD - Steps [24] T Steps O(T ) [55, 58] [3]
SGD - Step Size [24] Step Size α O(α) [55, 58] -
SGD - Model Averaging [24] αt O(
∑T
t=1 αt) [55] -
SGD - Minibatch Training Batch size b O(1
b
) [55] -
SGD - s-Dropout(Sec. 4.2) Rate s O(s) - -
SGD - Grad. Clipping [24] Grad. G O(min(G,L)) - [1]
SGD - Batch Norm.2 [41] γ, σ O( γ
2
σ2
) - -
Nesterov Acc. GD [11] T Steps O(T 2) - -
Heavy Ball Method [11] γ O( 11−√γ ) - -
Multi-Task Learning3 [33] T Tasks O( 1
T
) - [58]
Elastic Net [56] λ, γ O( 1
λγ
) - [37, 57]
Bridge Regression [37] p O( 1
p(p−1)
1
λ
2−p
p ) - -
k-partite ranking [21] λ O( 1
λ
) - -
Table 1: Uniformly stable algorithms and the parameters that control their stability. Related work
included in the last two columns indicate if the relationship to the described parameter has been
previously used in the context of output perturbation or objective perturbation. Theorem 7 implies
new privacy bounds in cases where this relationship was not known previously.
We present a modified definition of dropout as follows:
Definition 14 (s-Dropout). An s-dropout operator is a randomized map D : Ω → Ω with dropout
rate s ≤ 1 such that for every v ∈ Ω, ||D(v)|| ≤ s||v||
The difference here is that the contraction to the vector is by a factor of s or less in all cases, rather
than in expectation. This operator can be implemented for any given constant s by randomly drop-
ping components of v until the norm is smaller than s||v||.
The Lipschitz constant of the gradient update is then reduced from L to sL [24] and the gradient
update with step-size η is then ηsL-bounded, as opposed to ηL-bounded. As the stability of SGD is
O(L) [55], the stability is improved by a factor of s.
5 Applications of Privacy via Stability
In this section, we apply privacy via stability to the problem of private classification and feature se-
lection, providing an output perturbation approach to private elastic-net regularized algorithms [59].
Private Classification with Elastic-Net An alternative to L2-regularization is to penalize the L1-
norm of the obtained weights. This alternative (called LASSO) encourages sparsity and implicit
feature selection, with many learned weights equal to 0 [46]. Despite the advantages of sparsity, L1-
regularized models under-perform L2-regularized models in various scenarios. For example, when
there are many highly correlated features, or more features than data points, L2-regularization is
often preferable. In order to address the shortcomings of L1-regularization, elastic-net regulariza-
tion [59] uses both L1 and an L2-regularization: 1
n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(A
S(xi), yi) + λ(γ||wS ||22 + η||wS ||1).
Usually, η = 1− γ for γ ≤ 1 [59]. Elastic-net regularization allows for the retention of strong con-
vexity, due to L2 regularization, while also encouraging sparsity. Elastic-net regularized algorithms
satisfy β-uniform stability with β ≤ 2L2κ
nλγ
[56].
Elastic-net has been applied to generalized linear regression [20], logistic regression and support
vector machines [51] in scenarios where sparsity is a desired property of the resulting algorithm, for
example in medical applications [57].
Corollary 15. For any elastic-net regularized algorithm with convex loss ℓ, Algorithm 2 satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy.
4 Algorithm 2 uses L2-sensitivity due to [14, 55], this can be changed to L1-sensitivity with a factor of
√
d.
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Algorithm 2 Private Elastic-Net via stability
1: Input: S = {(xi, yi)} for i ∈ [1 : n], loss function ℓ, uniform stability β = 2L2κnλγ and privacy level ǫ.
2: wS ← minimizer of 1n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(A
S(xi), yi) + λ(γ||wS ||22 + η||wS ||1)
3: Return4: wS + ν where ν ∼ Lap
(√
(2β)/(λγ)
ǫ
)
.
Private Feature Selection with Elastic-Net Using Algorithm 2, we can obtain private regression,
classification and feature selection algorithms using the uniform stability properties of elastic-net
regularized loss functions.
In non-private elastic nets, feature decisions fi are made based on their weights wi as: fi = 0 if
wi = 0, and fi = 1 otherwise. That is, fi is selected for use iff it has a non-zero weight [59].
In the private version, zero weights may be perturbed by noise. Private feature selection can be
performed by obtaining differentially private model weights, as in Corollary 15, and then setting
those weights with absolute value below a specified threshold T to 0.
The following Lemma bounds the probability of a feature decision differing between private and
non-private versions.
Lemma 16. Suppose we have a threshold T > 0, weight wi and non-private and private feature
decisions fi and f
priv
i for all i ∈ [1, d]. Then, P [fi 6= fprivi ] = exp
(
− ǫ|T−|wi||λη
√
n
2L
√
κ
)
. As a direct
consequence, for
√
n ≥ L√κ(ǫλη)−1, P [fi 6= fprivi ] ≤ e−2(|T−|wi||).
6 Experimental Results
Our empirical evaluation focuses on the performance of private elastic net regularized classifiers
(see Algorithm 2) and the influence of stability on privacy noise and accuracy. We also show the
effect of private elastic net on feature selection.
Experimental set up. The experiments used the Scikit-learn implementation [36] of the elastic
net regularized logistic regression, which operates via SGD. Specifically, the weight of the L1 and
L2 penalty were 0.15 and 0.85. We used 10 seeded train-test splits with an 80/20% split ratio to
show mean performancemetrics on the test set with standard deviation. As a pre-processing step we
reduced the dimensionality of the features with Truncated SVD to generate 32 dimensional feature
matrices, which were standardized column-wise.
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Figure 1: Test accuracy of the private and non-private models on the LastFM Asia, Adults, and Gene
expression cancer datasets. The privacy noise is added optimally as a function of regularization
constant according to Algorithm 2. Accuracy increases with increasing stability.
Datasets. We utilized publicly available datasets with binary and multiclass classification tasks.
The LastFM Asia dataset [31, 39] contains users of the streaming service and the musicians these
people liked. The related task is to predict the country of origin for the streamers. The Adult dataset
[30] was extracted from a census database. The classifier has to forecast the income category (low
and high) of individuals using socio-economic indicators. The Gene expression cancer dataset [54]
contains cancerous tissue samples. Using gene expression measurements in the tissue, the task is to
predict the type of cancer.
Evaluation of Stability-Optimized Noise Tuning. Figure 1 shows the test accuracy of private and
non-private models as a function of the regularization coefficient. For each privacy level and regular-
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ization coefficient pair, the privacy noise was set optimally using Algorithm 2. The increase of the
regularization decreases the sensitivity of the private models, and thus requires less noise to achieve
the same privacy guarantee. Excessive weight regularization naturally degrades classification accu-
racy. The results confirm the idea from Section 4.1 that using privacy enhanced by stability can be
of net benefit in reducing error, while retaining same level of privacy.
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Figure 2: Test accuracy of the private and non-private models on the LastFM Asia, Adults, and Gene
expression cancer datasets. The privacy noise is added with Laplace distribution of constant scale b
which is found to be substantially inferior to tuning the noise to stability.
Figure 2 shows the effect of not using the relation between privacy and stability and using a fixed
noise level. For example, without knowledge of the implications of stability on sensitivity, one may
choose to a fixed noise level given by a fixed scale b to of the Laplace distribution. The result is that
accuracy in decreases quickly with increasing regularization.
Private Feature Selection. Elastic-net regularization has a natural tendency to generate sparse
model weights, and is thus useful for feature selection. We use here the idea described in Section 5
but set the threshold dynamically based on the standard deviation of the privacy noise parameter.
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Figure 3: The effect of artificial private model sparsification on the classifier weight structure simi-
larity for the Gene expression dataset.
We compared the features selected by private and non-private models and the corresponding F1
scores for the gene expression dataset are shown in Figure 3. At each value of regularization λ, the
threshold T was set based on the corresponding scale of noise. At extremely low λ, low weights are
rare. As the elastic net takes effect, the selected features start to differ. After a value of 0.1, the lower
noise scale has noticeable effect and causes the selected feature vector similarity to rise. Figure 5 in
Appendix B shows results for static cutoffs.
7 Conclusion
The results provided in this work directly link stability amplification to privacy amplification, further
motivating the study of the uniform stability properties. This motivation applies even to those models
which did not require stability results to guarantee generalization, which is the usual context for the
study of uniformly stable algorithms. These results also suggest further study of actions which do not
explicitly add random noise, but instead amplify the stability of the underlying learning algorithm as
a means of improving the privacy-utility trade-off. Sampling and shuffling, are some examples that
have been studied in similar contexts [2, 16]. Other directions for future work include weak convex
and non-convex losses.
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Broader Impact
This work belongs to the general area of private machine learning [1, 10, 27]. The objective being
to perform machine learning in a way that the final output does not reveal too much about the data
actually used in the input. Privacy is a major social concern in modern computing and machine
learning [18, 19, 47], and research in private learning algorithms are meant to mitigate those con-
cerns to some extent. Other than the obvious societal benefits, developments in private learning can
help development of better trained models, since training can be performed on sensitive data. This
protection can also reassure more people to contribute their data to develop learning based systems.
In this paper, we have shown that for algorithms with known stability bounds, privacy can be
achieved at a smaller loss of accuracy. Thus, equally private algorithms will have better utility
under these circumstances. This effect is particularly useful in applications with small training sets,
which is often the case for privacy sensitive domains. Medical data is one such area where datasets
are often small, and privacy is critical [23, 47]. Since many modifications to learning algorithms,
such as dropout [45], averaging and batch training that are commonly applied to training are known
to be stable [24], this result implies that such private versions of the algorithms (both current and
future ones) can now claim better privacy. Though care should be taken that the results in some such
works imply average stability [24, 28, 48, 34, 7], while our analysis requires a worst-case uniform
stability bound [55, 33, 56].
Our result can be applied in the form of “output perturbation” to computed models [14], which
means that it is easy for the non-expert to compute models using off-the-shelf libraries (such as
Scikit-learn [36], which we used in experiments), and then impose differential privacy on the models.
We hope this will help boost the popularity of private machine learning.
A potential risk in the use of private machine learning is that the implications of a probabilistic guar-
antee like differential privacy is not the most intuitive to the lay person, and as a result, there is the
risk of a gap between a citizen’s expectation of privacy and what an analysis like ours guarantees.
The label of a private algorithm may give a false impression of absolute protection, where the guar-
antee is really probabilistic, and the absolute level of privacy may depend on factors and adversarial
knowledge outside the model.
The limitations of the work presented here include the use of empirical results from a relatively
small number of tasks and the reporting of overall classification accuracy as a performance metric,
which can obscure differences in performance between classes. The experimental results satisfy
ǫ-differential privacy for each training run, however hyperparameter tuning was not performed pri-
vately [10], which should be the case in deployed differentially private systems. Private hyperpa-
rameter tuning was not used as our experiments were intended to show the relationship between
regularization and private model performance with the non-private results also presented for com-
parison. However, if used in practice, private hyperparameeter tuning is necessary.
This paper was intended to establish the theoretical concept. The practical adoption and evaluation
will require further work.
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A Proofs
Proof. (Theorem 4)
The proof is analogous to that of [40, 6], repeated here for completeness.
As AS is defined to minimize L(A,S), it follows that the partial derivative of L(A,S) evaluated at
S will have value 0. This is implied by the necessary conditions from Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
multipliers:
∂AL
R(AS , S) = ∂AL(A
S , S) + λ||wS || = 0 (3)
∂AL
R(AS
′
, S) = ∂AL(A
S
′
, S) + λ||wS′ || = 0 (4)
Construct an auxiliary risk function as follows:
L(A) = 〈∂AL(AS , S)− ∂AL(AS
′
, S′),wA −wS′〉+ λ||wA −wS′ || (5)
Where,wA represents the weights associated with some algorithmA andwS′ represents the weights
associated with the algorithmA trained to minimze LR over the dataset S′.
Note that:
1. The auxiliary risk function L(A) is convex as the first term is linear, and the second
quadratic.
2. By construction, L(AS
′
) = 0
3. L is minimzed by AS , as the partial derivative is given by:
∂AL = ∂AL(A
S , S)− ∂AL(AS
′
, S′) + λwA − λwS′
= ∂AL(A
S , S) + λwA
(6)
Therefore, L(AS) ≤ 0 as by the convexity of L its inflection point must have a value less than or
equal to the value of L(AS
′
).
The first term of L(A) can be simplified as follows, for (xi, yi) ∈ S:
nL(AS) = n〈∂AL(AS , S)− ∂AL(AS
′
, S′),wS −wS′〉
=
n∑
i=1
〈∂Al(AS(xi), yi)− ∂Al(AS
′
(x′i), y
′
i),wS −wS′〉
=
n∑
i=1
((
l′(AS(xi), yi)− l′(AS
′
(x′i), y
′
i)
)(
AS(xi)−AS
′
(xi)
))
+ l′
(
AS(xn), yn
) (
AS(xn)−AS
′
(xn)
)
− l′
(
AS
′
(x′n), y
′
n
)(
AS(x′n)−AS
′
(x′n)
)
≥ l′ (AS(xn), yn) (AS(xn)−AS′ (xn))− l′ (AS′ (x′n), y′n)(AS(x′n)−AS′ (x′n))
Therefore, by combining with L(AS) ≤ 0 we obtain:
0 ≥ nL(AS) ≥ l′ (AS(xn), yn) (AS(xn)−AS′ (xn))−l′ (AS′ (x′n), y′n)(AS(x′n)−AS′ (x′n))
(7)
Rearranging:
−nL(AS) ≥ l′ (AS(xn), yn)(AS(xn)−AS′ (xn))− l′ (AS′ (x′n), y′n)(AS(x′n)−AS′ (x′n))
(8)
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We obtain:
nL(AS) ≤ l′
(
AS
′
(x′n), y
′
n
)(
AS(x′n)−AS
′
(x′n)
)
− l′ (AS(xn), yn) (AS(xn)−AS′ (xn))
(9)
As, λ2 ||wS −wS′ ||2 ≤ 〈∂AL(AS , S)− ∂AL(AS
′
, S′),wS −wS′〉+ λ||wS −wS′ ||2, then:
nλ
2
||wS −wS′ ||2 (10)
≤ l′
(
AS
′
(x′n), y
′
n
)(
AS(x′n)−AS
′
(x′n)
)
− l′ (AS(xn), yn) (AS(xn)−AS′ (xn)) (11)
By the Lipschitz continuity of l this results in:
nλ
2
||wS −wS′ ||2 ≤ 2L||AS −AS′ ||∞ (12)
Using the reproducing property alongside the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, for each x:
|AS(x) −AS′(x)| = |〈φ(x),wS −wS′〉| (13)
≤ ||φ(x)||2||wS −wS′ ||2 (14)
=
√
(k(x,x)||wS −wS′ ||2 (15)
≤ κ||wS −wS′ ||2 (16)
Therefore, combining with (12):
||wS −wS′ ||2 ≤ 4Lκ
nλ
(17)
To instead obtain the uniform stability, use the Lipschitz continuity of ℓ to obtain:
||ℓ(AS(xi), y)− ℓ(AS
′
(xi), y)|| ≤ L||wS −wS′ ||k ≤ 4L
2κ2
nλ
(18)
Proof. (Theorem 7)
By the strong convexity of ℓ, for all x ∈ S:
ℓ(AS , x)− ℓ(AS′ , x) ≥ ∇ℓ(AS′ , x)T (wS − wS′) + λ
2
||wS − wS′ ||22
Which implies, by the uniform stability of ℓ:
β ≥ ∇ℓ(AS′ , x)T (wS − wS′) + λ
2
||wS − wS′ ||22
By the convexity of ℓ, we have that ∇ℓ(AS′ , x)T (wS − wS′) ≥ 0 for minimizer wS′ , therefore:
β ≥ λ
2
||wS − wS′ ||22
||wS − wS′ ||2 ≤
√
2β
λ
.
Proof. (Corollary 13)Due to Theorem 7, noise r1 drawn from the following distribution is sufficient
to provide ǫ-differential privacy for algorithm A1 which is β1-uniformly stable:
r1 ∼ Lap
(√
2β1
ǫ
√
λ
)
(19)
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In comparison, for A2, noise r2 drawn as follows will suffice:
r2 ∼ Lap
(√
2β2
ǫ
√
λ
)
(20)
Note that, for ǫ′ =
√
β2
β1
ǫ:
Lap
(√
2β1
ǫ
√
λ
)
= Lap
(√
2β2
ǫ′
√
λ
)
(21)
Therefore, algorithm A2 with noise drawn according to r1 satisfies
√
β2
β1
ǫ-differential privacy
Proof. (Remark 8)
||w˜S − w˜S′ ||2 ≤ 2δconv + ||wS −wS′ ||2 (22)
For λ-strongly convex functions, denote the loss achieved by w˜S as ℓ˜(AS , s), then for all s ∈ S and
minimizerwS :
ℓ˜(AS , s)− ℓ(AS , s) ≥ ∇ℓ(AS , s)T (w˜S −wS) + ||w˜S −wS ||22 (23)
≥ ||w˜S −wS ||22 (24)
Therefore, if |ℓ˜(AS , s)− ℓ(AS , s)| ≤ γconv:
||w˜S −wS ||2 ≤
√
|ℓ˜(AS , s)− ℓ(AS , s)| ≤ √γconv (25)
Proof. (Lemma 11)
δpriv = E[| 1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(wpriv, zi)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(w, zi)|] ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[|ℓ(wpriv, zi)− ℓ(w, zi)|] (26)
By the monotonicity of expectation, and the lipschitz continuity of ℓ such that |ℓ(wpriv, zi) −
ℓ(w, zi)| ≤ L|wpriv −w| we have that for all zi:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[|ℓ(wpriv, zi)− ℓ(w, zi)|] ≤ L
n
n∑
i=1
E[|wpriv −w|] (27)
As wpriv = w + r, where r is a d-dimenstional vector of random noise s.t. ri ∼ Lap(0, ∆fǫ ):
L
n
n∑
i=1
E[|wpriv −w|] = L
n
n∑
i=1
E[|r|] = LE[|r|] (28)
By the triangle inequality and the monotonicity of expectation:
LE[|r|] = LE[|ri|+ ...+ |rd|] ≤ LdE[|ri|] (29)
As ri ∼ Lap(0, ∆fǫ ), |ri| ∼ Exponential( ǫ∆f ) and E[|ri|] = ∆fǫ .
δpriv ≤ Ld
ǫ
√
2β
λ
(30)
Proof. (Lemma 16) Denote the random noise added to weight wi by ri.
Case 1: fi = 0. In this scenario, the feature decision changes if the Laplace noise ri results in a
private weight vector with absolute value larger than T . By a direct application of the cumulative
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distribution function of the Laplace distribution, with mean 0 and scale
√
2β
λ
where β = 2L
2κ
nλγ
, we
obtain:
P [fi 6= fprivi ] = 1− P [|ri| ≤ T ] = exp
(
− ǫTλη
√
n
2L
√
κ
)
Case 2: fi 6= 0. In this case, the feature decision changes if the Laplace noise is such that the private
weight has absolute value≤ T .
P [fi 6= fprivi ] = 1− P [|ri| ≤ |T − |wi||)] = exp
(
− ǫ|T − |wi||λη
√
n
2L
√
κ
)
Combining these cases, we obtain the result.
A.1 Average-Case Stability Results
Method Parameters Stability
Prev. Work
(Output Pert.)
Prev. Work
(Obj. Pert.)
⋆ SGD - Dropout [24] Rate s O(s) - [25]
⋆ SGD - Swapout [43] L O(L) -
⋆ SGLD- Agg. Step Size [34] Tk O(
√
Tk) - [52]
⋆ SGLD- Inverse Temp. [34] β O(
√
β) - [52]
⋆ RCD [7] λ O( 1
λ
) - -
⋆ SVRG [7] γ, T O(( 2Lγ1−2Lγ )
T ) - [50]
⋆ Entropy-SGD [8] α O(·) - -
⋆ 1-layer Graph-CNN [48] λmaxG O(λ
max
G ) - -
⋆ Bagging [15] m O( 1
m
) [28] -
Table 2: Uniformly stable algorithms and the parameters which can be used to control their stability.
Related work included in the last columns indicates if the relationship to the described parameter
has been previously used in the context of output perturbation or objective perturbation. ⋆ indicates
average-case uniform stability results, which require worst-case counterparts.
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B Additional Experiments
B.1 Suboptimal Noise Mixing with Changing Scale
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Figure 4: Test accuracy of the private and non-private models on the LastFM Asia, Adults, and
Gene expression cancer datasets. The privacy noise is added suboptimally according to a zero mean,
changing scale Laplace distribution with fixed regularization coefficients.
B.2 Non-dynamic Weight Cutoff
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Figure 5: The effect of artificial private model sparsification on the classifier weight structure sim-
ilarity for the Gene expression cancer dataset. When the weight regularization is high, dropping
small noisy weights ensures that the private and non-private models have similar sparsity structure.
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Figure 6: The effect of artificial private model sparsification on the classifier weight structure sim-
ilarity for the Gene expression cancer dataset. When the weight regularization is high, dropping
small noisy weights ensures that the private and non-private models have similar sparsity structure.
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